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MR. TRY-IT GOES TO WASHINGTON:
LAW AND POLICY AT THE AGRICULTURAL
ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION
Daniel R. Ernst*
In December 1933, Jerome Frank, the general counsel of the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration (AAA) but better known for writing Law and the
Modern Mind (1930), a sensational attack on legal formalism, told an
audience at the Association of American Law Schools a parable about two
lawyers in the New Deal, each required to interpret the same ambiguous
language of a statute. The first lawyer, “Mr. Absolute,” reasoned from the
text and canons of statutory interpretation without regard for the desirability
of the outcome. “Mr. Try-It,” in contrast, began with the outcome he thought
desirable. He then said to himself, “The administration is for it, and
justifiably so. It is obviously in line with the general intention of Congress
as shown by legislative history. The statute is ambiguous. Let us work out
an argument, if possible, so to construe the statute as to validate this
important program.”1 Although the memoranda the two produced were
interchangeable, Mr. Try-It wrote his in one-fifth the time.2
Perhaps some professors in attendance nodded approvingly, but Frank’s
speech, later printed in the Congressional Record, was startlingly impolitic
in its blurring of the distinction between “law”—Mr. Absolute’s starting
place—and “policy”—Mr. Try-It’s. In fact, the general counsel was himself
insisting upon this in battles with AAA administrators. How Frank actually
drew the line owed less to his legal realist jurisprudence than the
persuasiveness of his two associate general counsels, the radicals Lee
Pressman and Alger Hiss. They joined him at AAA soon after its creation in
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal History, Georgetown University Law Center. I
thank Sameer Ashar, Laura Kalman, Jed Shugerman, and Brad Snyder for their comments;
the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the Jewish Division of the New York Public Library, and
Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library for help with documents in their
collections; and Erie Taniuchi of the Georgetown Law Library for her extraordinary
assistance. This Article was prepared for the Colloquium entitled The Varied Roles,
Regulation, and Professional Responsibilities of Government Lawyers, hosted by the
Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 12, 2018, at
Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the Colloquium, see Bruce A. Green,
Lawyers in Government Service—a Foreword, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1791 (2019).
1. Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., Experimental
Jurisprudence and the New Deal (Dec. 30, 1933), in 78 CONG. REC. 12,412–14 (1934).
2. Id.
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May 1933 and were with him when Frank, Pressman, and others were fired
in a widely noted “purge” in February 1935.3
The circumstances that produced the AAA purge were quite unusual. The
firings occurred at an agency, launched in the midst of a national economic
emergency, with unprecedented power to organize almost all of American
agriculture.4 Frank combined the legal acumen and business sophistication
of a corporate lawyer with the learnedness of a legal intellectual and an
emotional vulnerability that made him susceptible to the certitude of his legal
lieutenants. The AAA’s first administrator wanted him fired but was forced
out instead;5 the second administrator also decided that Frank had to go but
for many months was stymied by Frank’s support from Secretary of
Agriculture Henry A. Wallace and Assistant Secretary Rexford Tugwell,6
who had been one of three Columbia University professors in the original
“Brains Trust” that had advised Franklin D. Roosevelt in his successful quest
for the presidency.7 Most AAA administrators were from rural places or
understood agriculture from their prior business dealings. In contrast, most
of Frank’s lawyers were city dwellers; many were the children of Jewish
immigrants. As an administrator observed, “None of them ever sweated a
drop in a tobacco field.”8
Most remarkably, Frank’s top lawyers were members of a communist
underground apparatus later known, after its organizer, as the Harold Ware
group.9 If Frank thought of himself as an “experimentalist” with “a critical
attitude towards Marxism and any kind of determinism,”10 the members of
the Ware group considered Frank “politically at best a vacillating liberal.”11
Even unusual cases can be instructive, however, if they bring to light
tensions and tendencies that typically are too subtle to attract attention.
Occurring at the dawn of the modern era of the government lawyer in the
United States, when a large cohort of elite law graduates first took entry-level
jobs in peacetime Washington, the purge at AAA was one such case. It
3. See generally Richard Lowitt, Henry A. Wallace and the 1935 Purge in the
Department of Agriculture, 53 AGRIC. HIST. 607 (1979); Lawrence J. Nelson, The Art of the
Possible: Another Look at the “Purge” of the AAA Liberals in 1935, 57 AGRIC. HIST. 416
(1983).
4. See PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 114–15 (1982).
5. Id. at 118, 132.
6. See id. at 147–49; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 74–
80 (1958).
7. See J. Y. Smith, Rexford Tugwell, Adviser in FDR’s ‘Brains Trust,’ Dies, WASH. POST
(July 25, 1979), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1979/07/25/rexford-tugwelladviser-in-fdrs-brains-trust-dies/68a9b1c6-d8c3-44f7-b7d0-2599bada50c4 [https://perma.cc/
244K-32LG].
8. Interview by Donald R. Lennon with J. Con Lanier, Adm’r, Agric. Adjustment Admin.
24 (Mar. 19, 1973) (transcript available at https://digital.lib.ecu.edu/text/10923
[https://perma.cc/34XB-GS8Z]).
9. See G. EDWARD WHITE, ALGER HISS’S LOOKING-GLASS WARS: THE COVERT LIFE OF
A SOVIET SPY 28–33, 38 (2004).
10. Jerome Frank, My Own Approach to the New Deal (on file with the Jerome New
Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
11. JOHN J. ABT WITH MICHAEL MEYERSON, ADVOCATE AND ACTIVIST: MEMOIRS OF AN
AMERICAN COMMUNIST LAWYER 38 (1993).
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starkly revealed that successful general counsels not only needed to know the
law and master policy but also appraise the political forces constraining their
and their clients’ decisions.
By March 4, 1933, two different approaches to addressing the calamitous
collapse in agricultural prices had substantial adherents. As embodied in the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, which President Roosevelt signed into law on
May 12, 1933, both approaches guaranteed producers of the most important
agricultural products the so-called “parity” price: one that would “give
agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles that
farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities
in the base period.”12 The first approach was McNary-Haugenism, named
for the sponsors of a bill embodying it that twice passed Congress only to be
vetoed by Calvin Coolidge.13 It was the brainchild of George Peek, president
of the Moline Plow Company and later the AAA’s first administrator.14 The
plan did not restrict production; instead, it used marketing agreements
between producers and processors to guarantee farmers the parity price and
paid for it with a tax on processors, which they passed on to consumers, and
whatever was realized by dumping surpluses overseas.15
The second approach, domestic allotment, offered the parity price to corn,
rice, tobacco, and hog farmers who agreed to limit their production to levels
set by the government and allocated by local committees of producers. As
the political sociologists Kenneth Finegold and Theda Skocpol write, it
required the government to determine “parity targets, processing taxes,
benefits rates, production levels, and acreage bases.”16 When implemented
in 1933, too late for farmers to have figured it into their spring planting and
farrowing, domestic allotment led to the ploughing up of cotton fields and
the slaughter of some six million piglets. Peek deplored the program as
“socialized farming,” but it was favored by Tugwell, Wallace, and an
influential group of agricultural economists.17
To ensure the passage of the farm bill, the two camps jointly proposed that
the Agricultural Adjustment Act authorize the AAA to pursue both programs.
Peek complied by creating two parallel divisions for most crops: a Division
of Processing and Marketing, staffed largely with business executives from
Dole Pineapple, Cudahy Packing, and other food processors, to implement
McNary-Haugenism; and a Division of Production, headed by the farm
expert Chester Davis, to implement the domestic allotment plan.18 After
12. Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-10, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 31, 32 (1933). The
period was August 1909 to July 1914 for all agricultural commodities except tobacco, for
which the base period was August 1919 to July 1929.
13. See John D. Black, The McNary-Haugen Movement, 18 AM. ECON. REV. 405, 405,
419 (1928).
14. VAN L. PERKINS, CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE: THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT
ADMINISTRATION AND THE NEW DEAL, 1933, at 21–22 (1969).
15. Id.
16. KENNETH FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA’S NEW DEAL
17 (1995).
17. GEORGE N. PEEK WITH SAMUEL CROWTHER, WHY QUIT OUR OWN 11 (1936).
18. FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, supra note 16, at 108–09.
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Davis succeeded Peek in December 1933, domestic allotment became
AAA’s dominant approach for most agricultural products, the principal
exception being milk and dairy products.19 In whatever combination, AAA
programs, assisted by a drought, raised farm income 50 percent and kept the
Midwest in the Democratic column in the 1934 midterm and 1936
presidential election.20
Roosevelt’s disregard for the neat hierarchy of Weberian bureaucracies
was nowhere more evident than in his farm program.21 As a formal matter,
AAA was an agency located within the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), but its importance dwarfed that of other USDA bureaus. Further,
Administrator Peek had not unreasonably hoped to be named Secretary
himself, and he retained from the McNary-Haugen campaign a vast network
of farm leaders whose support was thought vital for the success of any farm
program.22 Peek and Wallace arrived at a crucial meeting with Roosevelt
with conflicting organizational charts: Peek’s gave him a direct path to the
White House; Wallace’s required Peek to report to him.23 Although both
officials claimed victory,24 in fact Roosevelt split the difference: Peek could
bring major disagreements directly to Roosevelt, but only in the company of
Wallace.25 Such an arrangement was in keeping with the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, which, as Frank noted to Peek, charged the Secretary of
Agriculture, not the administrator, with implementing its provisions.26 A
further complication was Tugwell’s relationship with Roosevelt, which
predated and was closer than Wallace’s. Although Wallace outranked
Tugwell, Roosevelt would have been hard-pressed not to hear the former
Brain Truster out should he and Wallace differ.
The relations among the AAA’s general counsel, his nominal boss Peek,
and the USDA secretariat were another anomaly. Jerome Frank, the
grandson of German Jews who immigrated to the United States in the 1840s
and 1850s, had the highest grade point average in school history when he
received his law degree from the University of Chicago in 1912.27 He
worked as a clerk, associate, and finally partner at the leading Chicago law
firm Levinson, Becker, where even a demanding corporate practice could not
contain his questing mind and acute social conscience. He hobnobbed with
19. Id. at 109; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 75–76.
20. FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, supra note 16, at 109–10; WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 77 (1963).
21. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX 371 (1956).
22. See GILBERT C. FITE, GEORGE N. PEEK AND THE FIGHT FOR FARM PARITY 156–57, 248
(1954).
23. See KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS 278 (1986).
24. See id.
25. See IRONS, supra note 4, at 119; PERKINS, supra note 14, at 86 (noting that Peek
insisted on “jointly” being able to have access to Roosevelt with Wallace).
26. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK 22, 77 (Oral History Research Office,
Columbia Univ. 1960).
27. WALTER E. VOLKOMER, THE PASSIONATE LIBERAL: THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL IDEAS
OF JEROME FRANK 1 (1970); Neil Duxbury, Jerome Frank and the Legacy of Legal Realism,
18 J.L. & SOC’Y 175, 176 (1991).
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Carl Sandburg, John Gunther, Edgar Lee Masters, and other Chicago literati;
he was the legal brains behind a decade-long and ultimately unsuccessful
attempt to subject the city’s streetcars to effective municipal control; he
served in the kitchen cabinet of the Chicago reform mayor William Dever;
he was a witty and dazzling conversationalist who, with his poet wife
Florence, daringly discussed Freudianism and related “somatic” topics at the
dinner parties of Winnetka’s bon ton.28
“[W]ith all this,” an associate at Levinson, Becker recalled, “Jerry had
great feelings of insecurity. He would worry legal questions to death. For
no apparent reason, he would write long memoranda for the files defending
his decisions, covering himself for each step he took in any difficult case or
set of negotiations.”29 In 1928, Frank confessed his “growing . . . uncertainty
of predictions as to what courts would decide” to a fellow University of
Chicago law graduate.30 He developed his misgivings in what was nominally
a statement of what his circle of alumni wished for in a replacement for James
Parker Hall, who had served as dean ever since Joseph Henry Beale returned
to Harvard Law School after establishing legal education in Hyde Park on
principles developed by Harvard’s Christopher Columbus Langdell.31
Younger graduates of the law school, Frank wrote, “were puzzled and
dismayed, when they began their professional careers, to find that they were
practicing an art full of bewildering uncertainties where they had been led to
expect that they would be practicing something in the nature of an exact
science.”32 They had been taught that law was “a definite and complete body
of doctrine,” distinct from the facts to which it was applied.33 But this was a
fiction that ill-prepared them for the actual practice of law.34 The law of
corporations, for example, could not be deduced from first principles; it could
only be understood after taking stock of “manufacturing, stock market
operations, labor questions, men’s cupidities and men’s dreams.”35 Even an
honors law graduate, Frank wrote, would go “down in the struggle” unless
he learned to adjust legal abstractions to the “concretenesses of daily life.”36

28. VOLKOMER, supra note 27, at 5–6; Letter from Ulysses S. Schwartz, Judge for the
Superior Court of Cook Cty., to Richard Rovere (Dec. 20, 1946) (on file with the Richard
Rovere Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum).
29. ABT, supra note 11, at 17. Robert Glennon unearthed one such memo from July 1935,
shortly after Frank’s time at the AAA. ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS
REFORMER: JEROME FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW 219 n.70 (1985).
30. Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Laird Bell 1 (Apr. 12, 1928) (on file with the Laird
Bell Papers, University of Chicago Library).
31. Id.; see also WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 46–59, 71–75 (1982). See generally Floyd R. Mechem, James
Parker Hall, 23 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1928).
32. First Draft of Statement by Alumni of Recommendations as to Character of New Dean
2 (Apr. 12, 1928) (on file with the Laird Bell Papers, University of Chicago Library).
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 6. Frank published an elaboration of his views in Why Not a Clinical LawyerSchool?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933).
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Frank later described himself in those years as “restless, wanting to do
everything except what I was doing.”37 He was “constantly rebelling against
being a lawyer—doing it competently, but still, interiorly, objecting to it.”38
Internal conflicts absorbed his energy. Then, during a six-month business
trip to New York in 1928, a psychiatrist suggested that he try
psychoanalysis.39 Frank somehow persuaded him that twice-daily sessions
during his stay would suffice. The experience, Frank later claimed, marked
“a turning point in [his] life.”40
In 1929, Frank moved his family to New York and, on the
recommendation of the federal judge Julian Mack, who had been one of his
law professors, joined Chadbourne, Stanchfield and Levy. Levinson, Becker
had been, in Frank’s words, a “small large firm”; Chadbourne was one of
New York’s large Wall Street firms with “a factory system.”41 Some partners
were Jews, others were Gentiles, but apparently all of them were ruthlessly
avaricious. Although Frank was clearing $35,000 annually,42 the firm’s
rapaciousness appalled him. He sought some equivalent to the political
brawls that had sustained him in Chicago but could find no entrée to city hall
or the governor’s mansion. Authorship was another possible escape. He had
written two thirds of a novel on his Chicago commutes; now he tackled
nonfiction on his train rides from Croton-on-Hudson to Manhattan and back
again. Published in the fall of 1930, Law and the Modern Mind joined
Frank’s critique of legal formalism to a Freudian explanation of its appeal.
The desire for certainty in law, he argued, was an adult’s version of a childish
need for an authoritative father figure in the judge. What once tormented
Frank—“the widespread notion that law either is or can be made
approximately stationary and certain”—he now understood to be a
delusion.43 Mature thinkers freed themselves of this “carry-over of the
childish dread of, and respect for, paternal omnipotence.”44 They accepted
that law was the product of adaptation to “the realities of contemporary,
social, industrial and political conditions.”45 And they pictured “law as
continuously more efficacious social engineering, satisfying, through social
control, as much as is possible of the whole body of human wants.”46 Only
legal formulations that, after “repeated checkings,” were shown “still to be
working well” would be treated, “for the time being,” as “fixed and settled.”47
37. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 11.
38. Id. at 12.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 12.
42. See DAVIS, supra note 23, at 276. Frank’s annual salary at the AAA was $10,000.
EXEC. COUNCIL, LEGAL STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE: GENERAL COUNSEL’S OFFICE, AGRICULTURAL
ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 1 (on file with the Records of
the Office of Government Reports, National Archives at College Park, Maryland).
43. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 13 (Anchor Books ed. 1963).
44. Id. at 269.
45. Id. at 259.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 268.
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The book was a sensation. It restated for a wide audience the attacks of
such “legal realist” law professors as Walter Wheeler Cook, Karl Llewellyn,
Max Radin, and Hessel Yntema. Felix Frankfurter called it “the most
refreshing and self-examining piece of writing on law” of recent years and
struck up an acquaintance with Frank through their mutual friend Judge
Julian Mack.48 Yale’s legal realists finagled an appointment for him as a
“research associate.” Although Frank later deprecated his duties—the most
important one, he claimed, was smuggling bootleg liquor to New Haven—
he did become good friends with Thurman Arnold, William O. Douglas, and
other members of the faculty.49
Such distractions did not make the skullduggery at the Chadbourne firm
any more palatable. Before FDR’s election, Frank told Frankfurter of his
unhappiness; after it, he asked the Harvard law professor to recommend him
for positions in Washington or Albany.50 In mid-March, Frankfurter did just
that when Tugwell needed a solicitor for the USDA. Frank was “aggressively
imaginative,” Frankfurter explained, with both a “playful, dialectic,
argumentative side” and a “penetrating, practical-experience talent for
bringing results to pass in the world of affairs.”51 Wallace offered Frank the
post, but it figured too centrally in the calculations of Postmaster General
James Farley, Roosevelt’s principal patronage dispenser, to go to a New
Yorker.52 Tugwell and Wallace then decided that general counsel of the
AAA was actually the more important post and that Frank would have it as
soon as the Agricultural Adjustment Act became law.53
Meanwhile, Frank stayed in Washington, performing various tasks for
Wallace. Frank, Tugwell, and Wallace briefly roomed together in Wallace’s
spacious apartment until his family showed up. Thereafter Frank and
Tugwell shared rented quarters until their wives joined them.54 “Night after
night,” wrote the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “stray lawyers,
economists, newspapermen, and innocent bystanders appeared at the
house . . . and indulged heavily in conversation and bourbon.”55 Frank was
delighted by the parallels between the institutional economist Tugwell’s
debunking of the free markets and the legal realists’ debunking of legal
48. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Jerome N. Frank (Oct.
9, 1930) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress).
49. See THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 12–13.
50. Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Nov.
30, 1932) (on file with the Richard Rovere Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library
& Museum); Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Jerome N. Frank
(Oct. 19, 1932) (on file with the Richard Rovere Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential
Library & Museum).
51. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Rexford G. Tugwell,
Assistant Sec’y of Agric., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Mar. 15, 1933) (on file with the Felix
Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress).
52. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 14–15, 64–67; Interview
with Jerome N. Frank (Aug. 1, 1938) (notes on file with the Joseph Alsop and Stewart Alsop
Papers, Library of Congress).
53. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 15.
54. Id. at 25.
55. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 50.

1802

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

formalism. In his Association of American Law Schools (AALS) address,
Frank proposed that legal realism be renamed “experimental jurisprudence”
because of its “congeniality” with the approach Tugwell called
“experimental economics.”56 Like the economist, Frank considered the New
Deal “an elaborate series of experiments which will seek to show that a social
economy can be made to work for human welfare by readjustments which
leave the desire for private financial gain still operative to a considerable
extent.”57 He believed it would “permit the profit system to be tried, for the
first time, as a consciously directed means of promoting the general good.”58
Frank also believed that he and Wallace fundamentally agreed on the
AAA’s mission. Their relations “continued to be very friendly” throughout
1933, he recalled.59 “I was completely in Wallace’s confidence, and he . . .
backed me up a hundred percent.”60 Or so he believed: as Gardner Jackson,
a journalist and social activist who closely observed him at the AAA, wrote,
once someone agreed with Frank on the desirability of a course of action,
“Jerry in his own mind imbued that person with all the ardent
disinterestedness characterizing his own pursuit of his objectives.”61
Mindful that delay had sunk Frank’s appointment as solicitor, Tugwell and
Wallace swore him in on the day Roosevelt signed the Agricultural
Adjustment Act.62 Peek had wanted to hire Frederic Lee, an ally from the
McNary-Haugen campaign and a principal drafter of the new law.63
Recognizing that Frank would be the secretariat’s man in the AAA, Peek
gathered up Wallace and went to Roosevelt to insist on Frank’s removal.64
As a big-city lawyer and a Jew, Frank would be unacceptable to farmers and
farm leaders, Peek argued.65 Besides, Peek and Frank had a history. When
Peek was hired to manage the reorganized Moline Plow, Frank had urged the
creditors’ committee to reject his proposed employment contract because of
its too-generous profit-sharing provision.66 Peek got his contract anyway,
and when he resigned over a business dispute, he insisted on its terms.67
56. Frank, supra note 1, at 12,412, 12,414.
57. Id. at 12,414.
58. Id.; see also ALLAN G. GRUCHY, MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT: THE AMERICAN
CONTRIBUTION 405–70 (1947).
59. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 111.
60. Id. at 112.
61. Letter from Gardner Jackson to Richard Rovere 3 (Dec. 18, 1946) (on file with the
Richard Rovere Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum).
62. Compare Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) (stating
that the legislation is approved May 12, 1933), with Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Office of Pers. & Bus. Admin., to Jerome N. Frank (May 12, 1933) (on file with the Jerome
New Frank Papers, Yale University Library) (notifying Frank of his appointment effective
May 12, 1933).
63. See PEEK, supra note 17, at 93, 109; PERKINS, supra note 14, at 38, 96.
64. See PEEK, supra note 17, at 21; THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note
26, at 73–75.
65. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 73–74. In print, Peek
obfuscated: “[Frank’s] personality was such as not to inspire the confidence of the farm
leaders.” PEEK, supra note 17, at 21.
66. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 19–20.
67. FITE, supra note 22, at 76.
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Although Frank had confidentially urged the creditors to settle, they resisted
just long enough to persuade Peek that Frank had counseled otherwise.68
Peek ended up independently wealthy and permanently resentful of the
young Jewish lawyer from Chicago.69
Once again, Wallace acquiesced, but this time Frank, who had been
recruiting lawyers for over a month, refused to accept the decision. “This is
most infamously unfair,” he protested to Tugwell. “I’ve severed my
connections with [my] law firm. I took a chance that the bill might not
pass.”70 Frank also pointed out that he had been working for Wallace “on a
variety of other things,” including speeches and a reorganization plan for the
executive branch.71 The antisemitism of Peek’s case against him rankled; as
general counsel, Frank fretted over hiring too many Jewish lawyers.72 And
presumably he pointed out to Tugwell that he and Wallace could not control
farm policy without a strategically placed ally within the AAA. Apparently
Tugwell interceded with Roosevelt, for the next day Wallace, “in great
distress,” told Peek that Frank had to be retained. “If you force Frank to
resign, I will also have to resign,” Peek recalled Wallace saying. “[I]t will
interfere with all of our plans.”73
Peek told Frank that “Wallace hasn’t anything to do with this show.”74
When Frank, pointing to the statute, disagreed, Peek used his $10,000 salary
as administrator to hire Lee as his personal lawyer and brought him along to
meetings, notwithstanding his lack of an official appointment.75 When Frank
tried to staff his legal division, he encountered aggravating roadblocks.
Farley required Frank’s appointees to obtain “endorsements” from homestate politicians attesting that the lawyers had not actively opposed a
Democratic candidate.76 In addition, Peek’s coadministrator slow-walked
68. See THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 56–58.
69. Id. at 54–58; see PEEK, supra note 17, at 21–22.
70. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 73–74.
71. Id.; Interview with Jerome N. Frank, supra note 52, at 1; Letter from Jerome N. Frank,
Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., to Lee Pressman (Apr. 10, 1933) (on file with the
Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
72. Letter from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., to Alger Hiss,
Frank Shea & R. K. McConnaughey (Dec. 26, 1934) (on file with the Records of the Office
of the Secretary of Agriculture, National Archives at College Park, Maryland); Letter from
Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., to Henry Wallace, Sec’y of
Agric., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Aug. 20, 1933) (on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale
University Library); Letter from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin.,
to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Apr. 18, 1933) (on file with the Jerome
New Frank Papers, Yale University Library); Letter from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel,
Agric. Adjustment Admin., to Julian Mack (Apr. 17, 1933) (on file with the Jerome New Frank
Papers, Yale University Library).
73. PEEK, supra note 17, at 22.
74. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 74.
75. Id. at 74–77, 100–01; see also PERKINS, supra note 14, at 96.
76. Farley generally insisted upon endorsements, but some agency heads hired lawyers
without them. DANIEL SCROOP, MR. DEMOCRAT: JIM FARLEY, THE NEW DEAL, AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICS 84 (2006); Daniel R. Ernst, “In a Democracy We
Should Distribute the Lawyers”: The Campaign for a Federal Legal Service, 1933–1945,
58 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 4, 11 (2018).
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appointments and, after this dodge failed, complained that Frank had hired
too many Jews.77 The move backfired when columnists reported that
USDA’s “Anglo-Saxon purists” had placed “black marks after some of the
bluest bluebloods” in the legal division, including Alger Hiss.78
From the start, Frank envisioned a legal division staffed along the lines of
a Wall Street firm. The “stupendous” legal task confronting the AAA, he
warned, required “unusual ability and ingenuity on the part of our lawyers.”79
A private corporation faced with a comparable job would hire several leading
law firms.80 “I think it is up to us to do no less.”81 And because the other
side would hire “the best legal minds in America,” the members of the legal
division had to be “as intelligent as the most intelligent lawyers in the United
States.”82
Frank was obliged to find places for several political appointees, including
“a moderately capable” protégé of Senator John Bankhead, the son of the
president of the Farm Bureau, and Adlai Stevenson, whose father was Peek’s
friend.83 Still, he managed to assemble a remarkably able group of lawyers.
Frankfurter thought they “not only make up in fertility and imagination and
disinterestedness what they lack in experience but . . . in not a few cases have
maturity and instinct for experience beyond their years.”84 Lee Pressman,
the associate general counsel overseeing marketing agreements, had directly
overseen the work of Alger Hiss, the associate counsel overseeing production
control, when they were on the Harvard Law Review.85 Frank decided to
take him on as his “cub” at Chadbourne when Pressman brilliantly diagnosed
a knotty legal issue for him.86 Hiss had charmed Frankfurter with his
cultivation and deportment. The professor chose him to clerk for Justice

77. Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Henry Wallace, supra note 72.
78. Drew Pearson & Robert S. Allen, The Daily Washington Merry-Go-Round, UNITED
FEATURE SYNDICATE, INC., Aug. 31, 1933, https://auislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/
pearson%3A16144#page/1/mode/1up? [https://perma.cc/SA95-VSD8]; see also THE
REMINISCENCES OF GARDNER JACKSON 438–39 (Oral History Research Office, Columbia
Univ. 1959).
79. Letter from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., to George N.
Peek, Adm’r, Agric. Adjustment Admin. (June 16, 1933) (on file with the Jerome New Frank
Papers, Yale University Library).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Jerome N. Frank, Memorandum (Aug. 5, 1933) (on file with the Records of the Office
of the Secretary of Agriculture, National Archives at College Park, Maryland); see also Letter
from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., to Henry Wallace, Sec’y of
Agric., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Aug. 2, 1933) (on file with the Records of the Office of the
Secretary of Agriculture, National Archives at College Park, Maryland).
83. Letter from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., to Paul
Appleby (Aug. 3, 1933) (on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
84. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Jerome N. Frank, Gen.
Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin. (Sept. 29, 1933) (on file with the Jerome New Frank
Papers, Yale University Library).
85. GILBERT J. GALL, PURSUING JUSTICE: LEE PRESSMAN, THE NEW DEAL AND THE CIO 14
(1999).
86. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 131.
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Oliver Wendell Holmes and, after Hiss had worked at top firms in Boston
and New York, recommended him to Frank.87
Frank hired two lawyers he knew from Levinson, Becker, John Abt and
Arthur Bachrach, and gave temporary assignments to his Yale friends
Thurman Arnold and Wesley Sturges.88 Other AAA lawyers included the
Irishman Francis Shea (chief of the legal opinion section at the AAA and
another Frankfurter favorite), Carolyn Agger, Abe Fortas, Louis Jaffe, Ida
Klaus, David Kreeger, Victor Rotnem (Pressman’s lieutenant for milk
marketing agreements), Telford Taylor, and Nathan Witt.89 The Gentile
Stevenson dubbed Sigmund Timberg, Aaron Muravchik, and Bruno
Schachner, the “three wise men from the Columbia Law Review” and claimed
the Jewish trio arrived in the capital sharing a single suitcase.90 Not without
justification, an alumnus of the legal division called it “the greatest law firm
in the country.”91
As Schlesinger wrote, “[Frank] provided exciting leadership, fascinating
his aides with his speed and lucidity, shaming them with his memory,
resourcefulness, and limitless energy. The young men, dazzled by his
example, worked twenty hours a day, slept on couches in their offices and
hastily briefed themselves on the agricultural life.”92 Stevenson marveled
that Frank would schedule appointments as early as eight in the morning and
as late as eleven at night. Fortas claimed Frank would keep talking at full
speed when flat on his back, self-administering nose drops for his sinuses.93
Whether talking to “a Justice or a cub,” another lawyer recalled, Frank
displayed “the same generous interest and sympathetic consideration.”94
Gardner Jackson believed that even “the lowliest of Jerry’s hundreds of
lawyers” shared his vision of the AAA as “a holy crusade.”95
87. ALGER HISS, RECOLLECTIONS OF A LIFE 10–19 (1988); MURRAY KEMPTON, PART OF
OUR TIMES: SOME RUINS AND MONUMENTS OF THE THIRTIES 31 (Modern Library ed. 1998);
WHITE, supra note 9, at 3–33 (2004).
88. ABT, supra note 11, at 16–17, 22, 30–31; IRONS, supra note 4, at 125.
89. See IRONS, supra note 4, at 125; THE MAKING OF THE NEW DEAL: THE INSIDERS SPEAK
240–41 (Katie Louchheim ed., 1983); Carolyn Agger, Application for Position at the
Reconstruction Finance Corp. (Apr. 6, 1935) (on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale
University Library) (noting Agger’s employment in the legal division of the AAA and listing
Frank as a reference); Memorandum from Jerome Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment
Admin., to Mr. Byrd (Nov. 14, 1934) (on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale
University Library); Roster of Harvard Law School Men in Office of General Counsel, A.A.A.
on February 5, 1933 (on file with the Thomas G. Corcoran Papers, Library of Congress).
90. Adlai E. Stevenson, Agriculture, Alcohol and Administration 12 (1935) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Adlai E. Stevenson Papers, Princeton University Library); Roster
of Harvard Law School Men in Office of General Counsel, A.A.A. on February 5, 1933, supra
note 89.
91. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 30 (1990).
92. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 50.
93. Letter from Abe Fortas to Richard Rovere (Oct. 25, 1946) (on file with the Richard
Rovere Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum); Stevenson, supra note
90, at 10.
94. Letter from Raoul Berger to Richard H. Rovere (Nov. 4, 1946) (on file with the
Richard Rovere Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum). Berger
worked for Frank a few years after the AAA purge.
95. Letter from Gardner Jackson to Richard Rovere, supra note 61, at 7.
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But Jackson, at least, detected a flaw in Frank’s emotional makeup that his
subordinates also saw and exploited.96 Although Frank later claimed that
psychoanalysis cured him of internal “frictions”97 and self-doubt, during the
New Deal he was hardly the emotionally mature experimentalist of his AALS
address who he had boldly acted despite “partial and unavoidable
ignorance.”98 Frank “yearned for certainty,” Jackson maintained.99 “[H]is
never-resting brain” seemed “always to be on the search for more and more
precision.”100 Abt claimed that he, Pressman, and the other members of the
Ware group “looked down our noses at Jerome because he was a waverer.”101
After interviewing several former AAA lawyers, Frank’s biographer wrote
that the general counsel left “no stone unturned” and explored “all facets of
a problem” before settling on a strategy.102
Jackson believed Frank found the assurance he needed in Lee Pressman,
his cocksure and sardonic lieutenant, who was “certainty in the human
form.”103 Even after Pressman revealed that he had been a communist at the
AAA, Frank praised him as “quick, sure, ingenious,” and probably “the best
lawyer that I ever met,” who had “made life possible for me by his
organizational skill.”104 Jackson went further: “Pressman dominated Jerome
Frank.”105 He “could turn Jerry around on a decision on tactics almost at
will, and not infrequently did so.”106 Thomas Corcoran, Frankfurter’s bestconnected protégé in Washington, also apparently considered Pressman a
kind of Iago. Corcoran told Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes in 1937
that Pressman had “almost ruined Rex Tugwell and [Harry] Hopkins,” two
later bosses in the New Deal, by “stimulating” their ambitions.107
Frank needed no stimulation from anyone to insist that food processors not
use marketing agreements to pad their profits. Peek, in contrast, believed
that the companies were free to make whatever agreements they wished as
long as farmers got the parity price. His philosophy was well stated by the
president of the Farm Bureau, who demanded of Frank, “What the hell have

96. See generally id. Jackson’s recollections are not beyond challenge. An alcoholic, he
was not above embellishing his tale of the warmhearted liberal Frank’s victimization by the
hardheaded communist Pressman. ALLEN WEINSTEIN, PERJURY: THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE
155 (1978). Still, I have found nothing to contradict and much to corroborate Jackson’s
account.
97. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 11.
98. Frank, supra note 1, at 12,412.
99. Letter from Gardner Jackson to Richard Rovere, supra note 95, at 6.
100. Id.
101. GALL, supra note 85, at 26.
102. GLENNON, supra note 29, at 219 n.70. Glennon interviewed John Abt, Sigmund
Timberg, Telford Taylor, and Nathan Witt in May 1979.
103. THE REMINISCENCES OF GARDNER JACKSON, supra note 78, at 562; see also Letter from
Gardner Jackson to Richard Rovere, supra note 95, at 6.
104. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 131–33.
105. THE REMINISCENCES OF GARDNER JACKSON, supra note 78, at 561.
106. Letter from Gardner Jackson to Richard Rovere, supra note 95, at 6.
107. HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE INSIDE STRUGGLE
1936–1939, at 34–35 (1954).
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we got to do with the consumer? This is the Department of Agriculture!”108
But Wallace, who hoped to succeed FDR, and Tugwell cared about the entire
economy and believed higher prices would hurt farmers by making their own
purchases more costly. Frank agreed. The “indiscriminate creation of
monopolies,” without regard for their efficiency, he later explained, “was
certainly about as bad a thing as you could do and . . . wouldn’t effectuate
the policy” of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.109
Assured by Wallace that he would not approve an order before the legal
division reviewed it, Frank met Peek’s objections by pointing to two
provisions in the statute.110 The first was a section in the declaration of
policy, which was suggested by Tugwell’s fellow institutional economist,
Mordecai Ezekiel, but embodied in confusing language drafted by Frederic
Lee.111 The statute was intended not simply to guarantee farmers the parity
price but also “to protect the consumers’ interest by readjusting farm
production at such level as will not increase the percentage of the consumers’
retail expenditures for agricultural commodities, or products derived
therefrom, which is returned to the farmer, above the percentage which was
returned to the farmer” during the parity period.112 Pointing to that section,
Frank successfully argued for the creation of an office of the Consumers’
Counsel to check on the findings of the commodities divisions. Frank’s
Croton-on-Hudson neighbor Frederic Delano, FDR’s uncle and an elder
statesman of the city-planning movement, headed the office. Thomas
Blaisdell, assisted by “quite a group of good accountants,” became its top
economist.113 Gardner Jackson signed on as a publicist and strategist.114
The second provision exempted marketing agreements from the federal
antitrust laws if they effectuated the statute’s policies.115 Marketing
agreements that gave only a slight benefit to farmers and a huge one to
processors were not exempt, Frank argued, particularly if the processors’
share came “out of the hide of the consumer.”116 To verify that the
processors were not mulcting the public, his lawyers insisted, over Peek’s
objection, on clauses giving the legal division and Consumers’ Counsel
access to companies’ “books and records.”117
Peek and Frank battled each other into December 1933. The administrator
was convinced, as he later put it, that the legal division wanted to transform
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 22–23.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 88–89.
Id. at 71.
Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-10, § 2(3), 48 Stat. 31, 32 (1933).
THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 22. On Blaisdell, see
LANDON R. Y. STORRS, THE SECOND RED SCARE AND THE UNMAKING OF THE NEW DEAL LEFT
212–14 (2013).
114. THE REMINISCENCES OF GARDNER JACKSON, supra note 78, at 410–13.
115. Agricultural Adjustment Act § 8(2), 48 Stat. 31, 34.
116. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 92.
117. Memorandum from Thomas Blaisdell on the Policy Behind the Broad (Standard)
Books and Records Clause (June 22, 1934) (on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale
University Library).
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the AAA “from a device to aid the farmers into a device to introduce the
collectivist system of agriculture into this country.”118 He cited a
conversation in which Pressman proposed nationalizing not only the milk
industry but also grocery and department stores. When Peek sputtered that
that would be communism, Pressman coolly replied, “Call it what you may,
this plan is failing and Government operation has to come.”119 An
administrator in the tobacco section had a similar exchange with Pressman
and his associates.120 “They wanted to take the profit out of business,” he
recalled.121 “Then they wanted to take over and run the business.”122 When
the administrator protested that “youd [sic] have to change the whole
system,” the lawyers replied, “Well, lets [sic] change the system.”123
Frank did think the distribution of milk ought to be a public utility, but the
industry was already so heavily regulated that the U.S. Supreme Court
reached much the same conclusion in 1934.124 His talk of economic
experimentation left Frankfurter sighing that Frank “hasn’t much sense.”125
But Congress had already taken the really bold step by asking the AAA to
organize what Stevenson called “gigantic trusts in all the food industries.”126
Frank’s principal aim was the same as Wallace’s: to keep “a scheme for
propping up lots of big farmers” from overcharging consumers.127 As Frank
later protested to Frankfurter, “The packers and canners . . . were bitter
because I helped to prevent their obtaining unregulated and unscrutinized
exemptions from the anti-trust laws.”128 He had been “the one person with
a position of importance in AAA who represented Wallace’s desires to keep
down and if possible reduce price spreads and to avoid abuses of monopoly
privileges.”129
It had not been a walk in the park. The situation was “impossible,” Frank
“I’m representing one man
complained to Wallace’s assistant.130

118. PEEK, supra note 17, at 20.
119. George N. Peek with Samuel Crowther, In and Out: Adventures in Crop Control,
SATURDAY EVENING POST, May 30, 1936, at 18.
120. Interview by Donald R. Lennon with J. Con Lanier, supra note 8, at 24.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. According to Peek, AAA’s leftists told one of his associates that “the mission of
the Roosevelt Administration [was] to turn us into some new kind of socialist state” and urged
him to join the cause. PEEK, supra note 17, at 114–15.
124. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Stevenson, supra note 90, at 9.
125. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Louis D. Brandeis,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 9, 1935) (on file with the Louis D. Brandeis
Collection, University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law).
126. Letter from Adlai E. Stevenson to Ellen Stevenson (July 1933), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
ADLAI E. STEVENSON 248, 249 (1972).
127. Interview with Louis L. Jaffe by Jerold S. Auerbach 94 (1972) (on file with the
American Jewish Committee Oral History Collection, New York Public Library).
128. Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Dec.
20, 1935) (on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
129. Letter from Jerome N. Frank to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Jan.
21, 1936) (on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
130. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 155.
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nominally,” but in fact “[I’m] openly at war with [him].”131 “I can’t stand it.
I’m going to quit.”132 Peek also found the situation intolerable. On
November 15, he demanded that Wallace fire Frank. The general counsel
was sabotaging the milk marketing agreements, Peek charged, and had
“become almost impossible to a number of our most valuable assistants and
to me.”133
That Frank had in fact been Wallace’s faithful “watchdog”134 was
confirmed at a news conference on December 6, 1933. In what a journalist
termed “the coolest political murder that has been committed since Roosevelt
came into office,” the Secretary, with Peek at his side, declared the AAA’s
milk program a failure.135 Days later, Peek was gone, replaced by Chester
Davis. The legal division exulted. “We young fellows were well aware of
the varied crew that manned the New Deal ship of state and that some of our
crusading efforts had to be directed inwards,” Alger Hiss later recalled.136
Peek was “out of step with what we believed was the ‘true’ spirit of the New
Deal”—that of Wallace and Roosevelt.137 His “discomfiture and exit seemed
to us part of the script.”138
Out of fairness to Davis, whom he considered a much more reasonable
person, Frank stopped meeting with Wallace unless Davis was also present
after the spring of 1934.139 Still, Frank had the Secretary’s word not to
approve any order without the legal division’s prior review, and he still
believed he would back the legal division in conflicts with the
administrator.140 It did not seem to occur to him that in knifing Peek, Wallace
had dispatched “a rival potentate” and that Davis might oppose Frank without
publicly embarrassing Wallace.141
The legal division’s close scrutiny of marketing agreements continued to
generate conflict. Administrators were quick to blame the lawyers’
objections on their ignorance of farming. Decades later, the fact that the
“bunch of jews” sent from Washington to North Carolina could not
distinguish a tobacco barn from a tobacco warehouse still irritated one
administrator.142 Others had rolled their eyes when Stevenson asked a
delegation of California deciduous tree fruit growers what “deciduous”
meant143 and had guffawed when Pressman demanded to know what a

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. PERKINS, supra note 14, at 183.
134. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 22.
135. JAY FRANKLIN CARTER, THE NEW DEALERS 84 (1934).
136. Letter from Alger Hiss to Lawrence J. Nelson (Aug. 21, 1979), quoted in LAWRENCE
J. NELSON, KING COTTON’S ADVOCATE: OSCAR G. JOHNSTON AND THE NEW DEAL 87 (1999).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 154–55.
140. Id. at 89, 168.
141. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 20, at 76.
142. Interview by Donald R. Lennon with J. Con Lanier, supra note 8, at 23–24.
143. Stevenson, supra note 90, at 2.
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proposed agreement would look like for “macaroni growers.”144 More
generally, the commodities men accused the legal division of making policy
rather than simply stating the law. Peek claimed Frank was “so certain of his
cleverness that he thought he could frame new laws or interpret old laws in
such a manner as to carry out the theories he held.”145 Davis also believed
Frank thought himself “a prime policy man and not just a legal man.”146
But Wallace had assured Frank when hiring him that he would be “more
than a lawyer.”147 When Peek told his general counsel that his views on
policy were unwelcome, Frank countered that he and his lawyers could not
possibly “dismiss all questions of policy as none of their business.”148 His
first argument was a general claim, rooted in his jurisprudence, that law was
what the courts decide and that their decisions turned in part on “the
economic desirability of a particular statute, contract or other instrument.”149
To that extent, “policy influences a lawyer’s opinion on almost anything.”150
His second argument was particular to the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
Secretary Wallace’s orders were lawful only insofar as they effectuated its
policies. “[W]hat was a lawyer to do with a statute,” he demanded, when its
interpretation “depended upon, according to its very verbiage, whether it was
effectuating a certain policy” declared therein?151
With Davis, Frank made a show of not crossing a line he had earlier
declared “impossible to draw.”152 He scribbled “okay as to law, no comment
as to policy” so often on memos that an AAA official gave him a rubber
stamp of the phrase.153 Frank assured Davis that he had “leaned over
backwards to avoid” expressing policy “under the guise of a legal
opinion.”154 Nothing would be more unfair, Frank declared, than if a general
counsel were to convert his “judgment on pure policy into a judgment about
144. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 20, at 76. In Pressman’s defense, Peek’s biographer
volunteered that the lawyer might have been following a usage in the trade by referring to
durum wheat by the name of the pasta. FITE, supra note 22, at 261 n.22.
145. PEEK, supra note 17, at 21.
146. THE REMINISCENCES OF CHESTER C. DAVIS 291 (Oral History Research Office 1953).
147. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 164; see Memorandum
from Jerome Frank on Tentative Suggestions for Basic Principles to be Embodying in
Marketing Agreements with Processors Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act (July 7, 1933)
(on file with the Jerome New Frank Papers, Yale University Library); see also GLENNON,
supra note 29, at 221 n.121.
148. Memorandum from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., to
George N. Peek, Adm’r, Agric. Adjustment Admin. (Oct. 25, 1933) (on file with the Jerome
New Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
149. Memorandum from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., to
Chester C. Davis, Adm’r, Agric. Adjustment Admin. (Oct. 26, 1934), quoted in GLENNON,
supra note 29, at 96.
150. Id. For more, see LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, supra note 47; and see also Jerome
Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 233, 233 (1931); and Jerome Frank, What
Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 761 (1931).
151. THE REMINISCENCES OF JEROME N. FRANK, supra note 26, at 165.
152. Memorandum from Jerome N. Frank, supra note 148.
153. NELSON, supra note 136, at 83.
154. Letter from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., to Chester C.
Davis, Adm’r, Agric. Adjustment Admin. 2–3 (Feb. 9, 1934) (on file with the Jerome New
Frank Papers, Yale University Library).
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the law.”155 But of course, “insofar as a policy question has an obvious legal
aspect—as for instance whether a license or agreement violates ‘the declared
policy of the Act’”—Frank would have to consider the policy in question.156
A full telling of how Frank and his lawyers understood and deployed the
distinction between law and policy requires more space than a contribution
to a Colloquium affords. So does an adequate illumination of the murky
matter of the Ware group’s influence on Frank and his legal division.157
But briefly, most accounts have highlighted the controversy that
precipitated the purge of February 1935, which did not involve marketing
agreements but a provision in the “cotton contract,” drafted by Alger Hiss,
that required planters to maintain sharecroppers on their property after taking
land out of production in exchange for federal payments.158 The
administrators understood this provision (“Section 7”) only to require that
planters keep the same number of sharecroppers on their land, but the
lawyers, eager to help “the forgotten men of the New Deal,” more than half
of them African American, held that the planters had to let the same croppers
remain unless they had so conducted themselves “as to have become a
nuisance or a menace to the welfare of the producer.”159 Called to task by
Davis, Hiss showed how the ambiguous language could be read the lawyers’
way and reminded him that under the statute the ultimate interpreter was not
the administrator of the AAA but the Secretary of Agriculture.160
Hiss’s approach to interpreting Section 7 tracked, ceteris paribus, Mr. TryIt’s (of Frank’s AALS address) interpretation of the “certain statute.”161 If
Mr. Try-It began with his own judgment that “a proposed program for the
relief of the destitute” was desirable,162 Hiss explained that “we wanted
155. Id. at 2.
156. Letter from Jerome N. Frank, Gen. Counsel, Agric. Adjustment Admin., to Chester C.
Davis, Adm’r, Agric. Adjustment Admin. (June 27, 1934) (on file with the Jerome New Frank
Papers, Yale University Library).
157. Schlesinger wrote that the members of the Ware group induced the AAA liberals to
do “nothing of importance” that they “would not have done anyway.” SCHLESINGER, supra
note 6, at 54. Irons could find “no evidence that Communist Party membership or sympathy
affected in any way their work as lawyers, or that they acted differently from their colleagues
who were Democrats or even conservatives.” IRONS, supra note 4, at xii.
158. IRONS, supra note 4, at 156–80. A more frequent source of conflict between AAA
lawyers and administrators was, as Davis put it, Frank and Pressman’s insistence “on carrying
the power of examination of books far beyond the transactions” governed by marketing
agreements. THE REMINISCENCES OF CHESTER C. DAVIS, supra note 146, at 311. Pressman
was particularly aggressive in negotiating milk marketing agreements and had assigned John
Abt the extracurricular task of critiquing AAA’s milk program as “a tool of the dairy interests.”
ABT, supra note 11, at 39. Some months before the purge, Jackson learned that milk
distributors were plotting to oust Frank. Letter from Gardner Jackson to Richard Rovere, supra
note 61, at 3. Pressman, Rotnem, and Jackson were among the purged; none oversaw the
AAA’s cotton program. IRONS, supra note 4, at 179.
159. DAVID EUGENE CONRAD, THE FORGOTTEN FARMERS: THE STORY OF SHARECROPPERS
IN THE NEW DEAL 4, 141–43 (1965); FINEGOLD & SKOCPOL, supra note 16, at 145; IRONS,
supra note 4, at 175.
160. IRONS, supra note 4, at 175–76.
161. See NELSON, supra note 136, at 87–88.
162. Frank, supra note 1, at 12,413.
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to . . . aid the ‘forgotten men,’ the tenants and sharecroppers at the bottom of
the structure, at least as much proportionately as we aided the landlord.”163
If Mr. Try-It next determined that “the administration is for [the program]
and justifiably so,” Hiss maintained that the legal division “had been led to
believe (and reasonably led to believe) the Administration wanted” to protect
the sharecroppers.164 If Mr. Try-It then “work[ed] out an argument . . . so to
construe the statute as to validate this important program,”165 Hiss approved
the opinion section’s conclusion that Section 7 required planters not to
displace sharecroppers without cause.166
According to Jackson, Frank had originally considered farm labor
“political dynamite” the legal division “simply couldn’t afford to touch.”167
Yet, “as the months wore on and the impact of the plight of the sharecroppers
and other field laborers was borne in on him more and more, Jerry shifted
away from such strict adherence to political caution.”168 Pressman, Jackson
claimed, had been “a key factor in bringing about this shift.”169 Frank’s
original reading of the political landscape proved correct when Davis,
returning from a vacation in late January 1935 to find Southern congressmen
protesting the legal division’s opinion, convinced Wallace that they would
force the Secretary from office if he did not rescind the order and give Davis
permission to fire Frank and his allies.170 Frank had earlier written Wallace
that only the legal division could authoritatively interpret Section 7.171 After
talking to Davis, however, Wallace wrote of Frank and Hiss, “While I am no
lawyer, I am convinced that from a legal point of view, they had nothing to
stand on and that they allowed their social pre-conceptions to lead them into
something which was not only indefensible from a practical agricultural point
of view but also bad law.”172
163. NELSON, supra note 136, at 87–88.
164. Id. Hiss did not identify his basis for this claim, beyond his reference to Roosevelt’s
famous invocation of the “forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid” in a
campaign speech on April 7, 1932. DONALD A. RITCHIE, ELECTING FDR: THE NEW DEAL
CAMPAIGN OF 1932, at 86 (2007). FDR’s target on that occasion was the lending policy of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a matter without obvious implications for sharecroppers’
tenure.
165. Frank, supra note 1, at 12,413.
166. NELSON, supra note 136, at 87–88; Frank, supra note 1, at 12,413. Hiss was on loan
to a congressional investigation during the drafting of the memo and returned to the AAA in
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Years later, Jackson described what happened next. After Frank met with
Davis but before he confirmed his dismissal with Wallace, the seven purgees
and perhaps twenty others gathered in the general counsel’s large corner
office. Jerry “was in a high state of emotion,” Jackson recalled.173 He
“talked and talked and talked to us all in that peculiarly fervent and
unselfconscious way so characteristic of him,” pacing behind his desk,
pausing to drag on his cigarette and gaze down the Potomac.174 Wallace
could not possibly have approved Davis’s action, he declared.175 Why,
Wallace had just backed his lawyers in a tussle with the commodities men
over a books-and-records clause in the canned asparagus code. “This was
simply Chester’s bid for power. He was making a play to force Henry out of
the secretary’s chair so that he could occupy it himself.”176
Pressman demurred. “[S]cathing in his ridicule,” he derided Frank as a
“romanticist” and a “sucker” for thinking that his personal relationship with
Wallace would save them.177 “How can you be so naive?” he demanded.
“Some day maybe you’ll grow up and come to understand that friendship
doesn’t count when a man’s ambition for position and power is at stake.”178
“If I were in Wallace’s position, I would approve it. The political necessities
are such that he can’t follow any other course.”179
Contemporaries would reach their own conclusions about Frank’s tenure
as AAA general counsel. The business journalist W. M. Kiplinger voiced
one when he contrasted the reformers at USDA with two drafters of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. “Tom Corcoran and Ben Cohen have
done a swell job,” Kiplinger wrote Raymond Moley, formerly of Roosevelt’s
Brains Trust.180 “They are both quick to learn how to wiggle through the line
and still not fumble the ball. It’s a quality which such men as Wallace,
Tugwell and Frank just will not acquire.”181
For Kiplinger, “the ball” was public policy: the protection of investors in
Corcoran and Cohen’s case; the protection of consumers in Frank’s.182 The
ball can also be thought of as the professional authority of lawyers. As the
sociologist Terence Halliday has noted, because lawyers assert “technical
authority in a normative system, namely, the law,” they have “an unusual
opportunity to exercise moral authority in the name of technical advice.”183
But a danger lurks within that opportunity. So readily can they move from
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one form of authority to another—from law to policy—that the lawyers
themselves can “become uncertain as to the bounds of their expert role.”184
Mr. Absolute might have been deluding himself when he imagined law as
“legal principles [that] must prevail absolutely,” but his legal formalism
allowed him to assert his professional authority from high ground.185 Mr.
Try-It, who presumably shared Frank’s functionalist understanding of law as
the judicial recognition of social needs, occupied less easily defended terrain.
Perhaps he could still claim a kind of technical authority by arguing that
lawyers were better than administrators at predicting how judges responded
to those needs, but if the immanent rationality of society would ultimately
carry the day, why were city-bred lawyers better at divining it than
administrators who knew agriculture firsthand? And did lawyers’ technical
expertise extend to identifying which of several seemingly functional courses
of action would ultimately prevail? Arguably, the social order of the Cotton
South required that sharecroppers received shelter and a share of the AAA’s
benefit payments. But arguably, too, it required a curtailment of cotton
production obtainable only through the AAA, which planters would abandon
rather than see it endow their sharecroppers with a federally enforceable
possessory right. Could AAA lawyers really predict which perception of
social need would guide judges when they interpreted the ambiguous
language of Section 7?186
Frank may have thought they could, but others were unconvinced. Mr.
Jerome Frank was “a brilliant lawyer,” the public administration scholar
Leonard D. White wrote, but his “principal interest in the AAA was
undoubtedly policy and not law.”187 He had “indulge[d] in the luxury of
insisting upon his theory of social organization” when he should have just
given legal advice.188 Corcoran called Frank a “doctrinaire damn fool.”189
He and other government lawyers thought what Frank derided as the “Jovian
fiction” of legal certainty was too valuable a source of technical authority to
jeopardize with “gratuitous candor” about the inextricability of law and
policy.190 Protecting consumers and sharecroppers were laudable goals, but
in pursuing them Frank had gravely misjudged the political forces he faced.
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At least some well-connected government lawyers blamed radicals on his
legal staff for leading him astray.191
Jerome Frank at the AAA thus became an object lesson on how not to be
a general counsel. Government lawyers might enforce policies only
imperfectly expressed in their enabling statute (as the protection of
consumers was in the Agricultural Adjustment Act), but their professional
authority would fail them if they sought to effect fundamental social change
without a strong legislative mandate. “[Y]ou cannot change the basic
economic structure of a society that doesn’t want to change, just by edicts
from the center,” even Alger Hiss belatedly concluded.192 Making public
officials act not by decree or for self-aggrandizement but in accordance with
law has been a sufficient challenge for government lawyers, and a vital one.
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